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The reality is a continuum which connects Indian
flesh sizzling over Puritan fires and Vietnamese
flesh roasting under American napalm. The reality
is the compulsion of a sick society to rid itself of
men like Nat Turner and Crazy Horse, George
Jackson and Richard Oaks, whose defiance uncov-
ers the hypocrisy of a declaration affirming every-
one's right to liberty and life. The reality is an
overwhelming greed which began with the theft of
a continent and continues with the merciless loot-
ing of every country on the face of the earth which
lacks the strength to defend itself.
- Richard Lundstrom
During the first half of the 1970s, the American In-
dian Movement (AIM) came to the forefront of a drive
to realize the rights of treaty-guaranteed national sover-
eignty on behalf of North America's indigenous peo-
ples. For the government and major corporate interests
of the United States, this liberatory challenge repre-
sented a considerable threat. On the one hand, Indians
possess clear legal and moral rights to the full exercise
of self-determination; on the other hand, their reserved
land base contains substantial quantities of critical min-
eral resources. More than half of all known "domestic"
U.S. uranium reserves lie within the boundaries of pres-
ent-day Indian reservations, as do as much as a quarter
of the high grade low sulphur coal, a fifth of the oil and
natural gas, and major deposits of copper and other
metals.' Loss of internal colonial control over these
items would confront U.S. 6lites with significant strate-
gic and economic problems.
The United States government set out to liquidate
AIM's political effectiveness in order to maintain and re-
inforce the federal system of administering Indian
Country. For a number of reasons, the crux of the con-
flict came to be situated on the Pine Ridge Sioux Reser-
vation, home of the Oglala Lakota people, in what is
now the state of South Dakota. Throughout the mid-
70s, the FBI and a surrogate organization calling itself
Guardians of the Oglala Nation (GOONs) conducted
what amounted to low intensity warfare against AIM in
this remote locale. 2 The Bureau and its various apolo-
gists3 have consistently denied not only that a de facto
counterinsurgency effort was mounted on Pine Ridge,
but also that there was any direct relationship between
the FBI and the GOONs. Those uttering claims to the
contrary have been publicly dubbed "left wing Mc-
Carthyites," and accused of engaging in "innuendo"
and attributing "guilt by association."
4
Writer Peter Matthiessen, one of the more com-
prehensive and careful analysts of the "AIM-GOON
Wars," has also been the target of two frivolous but
massive and prolonged lawsuits, designed to suppress
his 1983 book on the topic, In the Spirit of Crazy Horse.
Matthiessen's sins were allegedly a "defaming of the
characters" of David Price, an agent heavily involved in
the repression of AIM, and William "Wild Bill"Janklow,
former attorney general and then governor of the state
of South Dakota, who headed one of the many white vig-
* © 1991, Ward Churchill
I. See U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, Indian
.Mlinerat Development, 97th Congress, 2d Session, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1982.
2. As to the accuracy and appropriateness of the term "low
intensity warfare" in this connection, see Kitson, Frank, Low Inten-
sit ' Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peace-Keeping, Stackpole
Books, Harrisburg, PA, 1971. It should be noted that the FBI, in
its internal documents of the mid-70s, referred to AIM, not as
"militants." "radicals," or "political extremists," but as "insur-
gents". see, for example, the memorandum from SAC Portland to
the Director, FBI, dated 2/6/76, and reproduced at p. 264 of
Churchill, Ward, and Jim Vander Wall, The COINTELPRO Papers:
Documents fiont the FBI's Secret llars Against Dissent in the United States,
South End Press, Boston, 1990. It should also be noted that a for-
mer operational commander of the FBI forces on Pine Ridge,
Norman Zigrossi. in a 1990 interview with filmmaker Michael
Apted, repeatedly described his agents' mission on the reservation
during the critical period, not as "investigation" or "law enforce-
ment," but as "peace-keeping" (copy on file).
3. These apologists have often included "scholarly experts"
like Athan Theoharis and Alan Dershowitz.
4. For a sample of the Bureau's official denials, see excerpts
from an interview with an FBI Public Information Officer, con-
tained in Lan Brookes Ritz' documentary film, ..hnie .ae: . Brave
Hearted Jl'oman, Brown Bird Productions, Los Angeles, 1979. Con-
cerning the "experts," see Theoharis, Athan, "Building a File:
The Case Against the FBI," W1ashington Post, October 30, 1988;
and Dershowitz, Alan, "Can Leonard Peltier be the Andrei
Sakharov of America?", DenVer Post, October 21, 1984. An inter-
esting example of a "progressive" commentator regurgitating es-
sentially the same reactionary views will be found in Gordon.
Diana, "Doing Edgar Proud," The Nation, November 13, 1989.
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ilante groups operating in the Pine Ridge area during
the mid-70s. Both Price and Janklow, it appears, re-
ceived substantial support from governmental and cor-
porate quarters - as well as financing from such overtly
right-wing entities as the Heritage Foundation - in
keeping the Matthiessen study off the shelves for nearly
a decade.! As a consequence, it was not until the spring
of 1991 that the American public was accorded an op-
portunity to read what this much celebrated author has
to say about the events in question.
A major crack in the stone wall of F.B.I. official and
quasi-official "plausible deniability" has now appeared,
in the person of Duane Brewer, former second in com-
mand of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) police, and
eventual head of the Highway Safety Program on Pine
Ridge. Along with his superior in the BIA, Delmar East-
man, Brewer admits to having served as a primary com-
mander of the reservation GOON squads and to having
participated directly in many of the organization's most
virulently anti-AIM activities. In a 1987 interview given
to independent filmmakers Michel Dubois and Kevin
Barry McKiernan and later broadcast in a PBS docu-
mentary, Brewer sheds light on how the F.B.I. utilized
the GOONs within a wider campaign to destroy AIM
and "Indian militancy" in general. 6 His statements
should go far in establishing that the federal govern-
ment has resorted to the employment of outright death
squads as an integral aspect of its programs of domestic
political and social repression.
THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST AIM: BACKGROUND
During the three year period from roughly mid-
1973 through mid-1976, at least 69 members and sup-
porters of AIM died violently on Pine Ridge (see accom-
panying list, "AIM Casualties on Pine Ridge, 1973-76").
Nearly 350 others suffered serious physical assaults, in-
cluding gunshot wounds, stabbings, beatings adminis-
tered with baseball bats and tire irons, having their cars
rammed and run off the road at high speed, and their
homes torched as they slept. 7 Researchers have deter-
mined that the politically motivated death toll on Pine
Ridge made the murder rate for the reservation 170 per
100,000 during the crucial period.'
These figures do not include the "typical" high
rate of fatalities experienced on Pine Ridge and most
other American Indian reservations. Rather, the "mur-
der rate of 170 per 100,000 - almost nine times that of
Detroit - takes into account only deaths caused by the
physical repression of Indian resistance." 9 Nowhere in
North America has there been a comparable rate of
homicide during the 20th century.1 0 To find counter-
parts, one must turn to contexts of U.S.-sponsored
political repression in the Third World.
The political murder rate at Pine Ridge... was al-
most equivalent to that in Chile during the three
years after a military coup supported by the United
States deposed and killed President Salvador Al-
lende.. .Based on Chile's population of 10 million,
the estimated fifty thousand persons killed in the
three years of political repression in Chile at about
the same time (1973-1976) roughly paralleled the
murder rate at Pine Ridge.I
Under the Major Crimes Act,' 2 murder on an In-
dian reservation falls under the jurisdiction of "federal
authorities." Since at least as early as 1953, this has
meant the FBI. t Not one of the murders of AIM people
on Pine Ridge during the mid-70s was ever solved by
the Bureau, despite the fact that in a number of in-
stances the assailants were identified by one or more
eyewitnesses. In many cases, investigations were never
opened. When questioned about this apparent inactivity
on the part of his personnel, George O'Clock, who until
mid-1975 was the Assistant Special Agent in Charge
(ASAC) of the FBI's Rapid City Resident Agency (whose
jurisdiction includes Pine Ridge), pleaded "lack of man-
power" as the reason. 14 At the very moment he spoke,
however, O'Clock was overseeing the highest ratio of
5. On the suits against Matthiessen and his publisher, Viking
Press, see Churchill, Ward, "GOONs, G-Men, and AIM: At last
the story will be told," The Progressive, April 1990.
6. The documentary, entitled The Spirit of Crazy Horse, was pro-
duced by Michel Dubois and Kevin McKiernan, and first aired on
December 18, 1990. The author is in possession of a 125 page
transcription of the Brewer interview from which the televised ex-
cerpts were drawn.
7. These are minimum figures, derived from reports collected
by researcher Candy Hamilton, who resided on Pine Ridge
throughout the period at issue as an unpaid paralegal volunteer
for the Wounded Knee Legal Offense/Defense Committee
(WKLDOC).
8. Johansen, Bruce, and Roberto Maestas, llasi'chu: The Contin-
uing Indian Ilars, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1979, p. 83.
9. Johansen and Maestas, op. cit., p. 84.
10. By comparison [with Pine Ridge], Detroit, the reputed
murder capital of the United States," had a rate of 20.2 per
100,000 in 1974. The U.S. average rate was 9.7 per 100,000, with
the average for large cities as follows: Chicago, 15.9; New York
City, 16.3; Washington, D.C., 13.4; Los Angeles, 12.9; Seattle,
5.6; and Boston, 5.6. An estimated 20,000 persons were murdered
in the United States in 1974. In a nation of 200 million persons, a
murder rate comparable with that of Pine Ridge between 1973
and 1976 would have left 340,000 persons dead for political rea-
sons in one year, 1.32 million in three. A similar rate for a city of
500,000 would have produced 850 political murders in a year,
2,550 in three. For a metropolis of 5 million, the figures would
have been 8,500 in one year and 25,500 in three. Johansen and
Maestas, op. cit., p. 83. The authors rely on data from the FBI 'Uni-
form Crime Report, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C., 1975.
11. Johansen and Maestas, op. cit., p. 84.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
13. For a capsule history of FBI jurisdiction on Indian reserva-
tions, see American Indian Policy Review Commission, Final Re-
port, Task Force .Vine: Law Consolidation, Revision and Codification, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1977, pp. 173-4.
Also see U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Indian Tribes: A Continn-
ing Quest for Snvival, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing-
ton, D.C., 1981, p. 145.
14. This is incorporated into official findings: "[Wihen Indians
complain about the lack of investigation and prosecution on reser-
vation crime, they are usually told the Federal government does
not have the resources to handle the work." See U.S. Department
of Justice, Report of the Task Force on Indian .Matters, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1975, pp. 42-3.
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agents to citizens over a sustained period enjoyed by
any resident agency in the history of the Bureau. 15 As
O'Clock himself later put it, the normal compliment of
personnel for Rapid City was four agents, three investi-
gators plus the ASAC. During the anti-AIM campaign,
however, things were different:
Most of the time before the 1970s, there were just
four agents assigned to this resident agency and
we covered the western half of South Da-
kota. . .which included the Rosebud and Pine
Ridge Indian Reservations. Then, from 1972-73 to
the time of my retirement, the resident agency al-
most tripled in size insofar as agents and FBI per-
sonnel were concerned. . .[Actually, by the
summer of 1975, the resident agency had more
than quadrupled]; there were probably eighteen
agents assigned there. [After that], there were
many, many more, at different times, thirty to forty
agents working. 16
All told, O'Clock admits that between January of
1973 and the end of 1975, there were at least 2,500 dif-
ferent Bureau personnel temporarily assigned to his of-
fice. A peak number of "probably 350" was reached
during July of 1975, with an average of "about 200 to
250" maintained for the six months from July 1 until
December 31, 1975. Far from there being a "lack of
manpower," O'Clock acknowledged that there were in
fact "too many agents in the area [emphasis added]" to be
effective, or even to be kept track of. Consequently, by
August of 1975 O'Clock's successor in Rapid City was
actively reducing a 100 agent surplus in his roster.t 7 In
other words, the Rapid City office was consistently over-
staffed throughout the crucial three-year period. At
times the entire western South Dakota region was abso-
lutely saturated with FBI personnel. These personnel
engaged in a virtual orgy of investigative and other ac-
tivities while posted at Pine Ridge. For instance, while
professing to be too shorthanded to assign agents to
look into the killing and maiming of AIM members and
supporters, O'Clock managed to find ample resources
15. Ibid., pp. 42-3.
16. Interview of retired Rapid City ASAC George O'Clock by
Michel DuBois and Kevin Barry McKiernan, 1987; transcript copy
on file.
17. Zigrossi is the FBI official who explained to investigative
journalist David Weir and Lowell Bergman in 1978 that, in his
view, the proper function of the Bureau on Indian reservations is
to serve as a "colonial police force." See Weir, David, and Lowell
Bergman, "The Killing of Anna Mae Aquash," Rolling Stone, April
7, 1977, p. 5.
18. U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on
Internal Security, Revolutionary .ctivities Within the United States: The
.imeican Indian .lovement, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash-
ington, D.C., 1975, p. 61.
19. U.S. v. Consolidated Wounded Knee Cases, CR. 73-5019, U.S.
District Court for Nebraska, Lincoln, 1974.
20. U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings Before the Subcommit-
tee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, 97th Congress, 1st Session on FBI
.. Ithori-atio, Varch 19, 24, 25; April 2 and 8, 1981, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1981.
21. Quoted from audio tape in Churchill, Ward, and Jim Van-
to investigate the victims. The Rapid City FBI office
amassed some 316,000 separate investigative file classi-
fications with regard to AIM activities during the famous
1973 siege of Wounded Knee alone.' 8 This enormous
expenditure of investigative energy made it possible for
the FBI to file 562 federal charges against various AIM
members during the second half of 1973.'9 The result,
after more than two years of trials, was a paltry 15 con-
victions-by far the lowest ratio of guilty verdicts to
agent hours invested and charges filed in FBI history.
All of the convictions were for such trivial offenses as
"interference with a postal inspector in performance of
his lawful duty."
'20
Nonetheless, O'Clock's effort was not a failure,
given the broader goals of the FBI. The effectiveness of
the endeavor was well explained in 1974 by Colonel
Volney Warner, a counterinsurgency warfare specialist
and military advisor to the FBI on Pine Ridge. He ob-
served that convictions were not the object of the effort.
By simply filing charges, the Bureau was able to keep
"many of AIM's most militant leaders and followers
under indictment, in jail or [with] warrants out for their
arrest." The movement's financial resources were as a
result necessarily diverted to legal defense efforts. By
pursuing such tactics, Colonel Warner argued, the gov-
ernment could effectively neutralize AIM as a political
force: "the government can win, even if no one goes to
[prison]."'2 1 Meanwhile, what the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights described as "a reign of terror" on Pine
Ridge continued, unimpeded by interference from the
FBI. 22 Indeed, according to all indications, the Bureau
not only encouraged, but actively aided and abetted it.
THE GOONs
The fact that the GOONs had a tangible relation-
ship to the federal government has all along been clear,
given that the group was formed in late 1972 through a
federal BIA grant of $62,000 to then Pine Ridge Tribal
President Dick Wilson to establish a "Tribal Ranger
Group."' 23 From 1973 onward, funding of GOON pay-
rolls seems to have accrued from the Wilson administra-
tion's misappropriation of block granted federal
der Wall, Agents of Repression: The FBI's Secret Wars Against the Black
Panther Party and the American Indian Movement, South End Press,
Boston, 1988, p. 329. Warner appears to be borrowing from the
thinking of British counterinsurgency expert (and consultant to
the U.S. government) Robin Evelegh, who explains the operant
concept rather well in his Peace-Keeping in a Democratic Society: The
Lessons of Northern Ireland (C. Hurst and Company, London, i978).
22. Hill Witt, Shirley, and William Muldrow, .lonitoring of Events
Related to the Shootings of Two FBI Agents on the Pine Ridge Reservation,
U.S. Commission on Human Rights, Rocky Mountain Regional
Office, Denver, July 9, 1975.
23. The amount is from Wilson's testimony during congres-
sional hearings on Pine Ridge violence excerpted in Saul Landau's
documentary film, Voices From W1onnded Knee, Institute for Policy
Studies, Washington, D.C., 1974. Why a ranger unit was needed
on Pine Ridge when the BIA police already had adequate numbers
has never been adequately explained by federal authorities. Wil-
son's version is that the GOONs were to serve as "an auxiliary
police force. . .to handle people like Russell Means and other
radicals."
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highway improvement monies (the "Rangers" were offi-
cially expanded to include a "Highway Safety Program"
for this purpose).2 4 Most federal housing funds allo-
cated to Pine Ridge during the two terms of Wilson's
presidency also appear to have been devoted to re-
warding members of the GOON squad for services ren-
dered.2 5 Many of Wilson's relatives 26 as well as perhaps
one third of the BIA police force on the reservation
were quickly rostered as GOONs.
2 7
Wilson received quiet federal support in running
Pine Ridge as a personal fiefdom as a quid pro quo for his
cooperation in casting an appearance of legitimacy upon
an illegal transfer of land to the federal government.
The exchange required that the Sheep Mountain Gun-
nery Range- approximately one-eighth of the total res-
ervation area-be ceded from Indian to federal
ownership, in blatant violation of the federal treaty with
the Lakota people. Although it was cloaked in official
secrecy at the time, the motivation for this federal ma-
neuver was the discovery of rich molybdenum and ura-
nium deposits within the Gunnery Range. Both are
considered to be critical strategic minerals by the Penta-
gon; access to them is a matter of "National Security."
'28
The GOONs were necessary to quell resistance among
traditional grassroots Oglalas to any such illegal trans-
action.2 1 When AIM moved in at the request of the
traditionals, the GOONs shifted from intimidation tac-
tics to outright death squad activities, thus pursuing not
only their original objective but the broader federal goal
of eliminating AIM as a viable political force as well.
A number of studies have concluded that the
GOONs were responsible for the bulk of the AIM fatali-
ties on Pine Ridge. In those cases where witnesses iden-
tified the murderers, the culprits invariably turned out
to be known members of the reservation GOON squad.
Yet, in most instances, no formal FBI investigation
resulted.
On the afternoon of March 21, 1975, Edith Eagle
Hawk, her four-month-old daughter, and three-
year-old grandson were killed when their car was
forced into a deep ditch alongside Highway 44, be-
tween Scenic [South Dakota] and Rapid City. Edith
Eagle Hawk was a defense (alibi) witness for AIM
member Jerry Bear Shield, who was at the time ac-
cused of killing a GOON, William Jack Steele, on
March 9 (charges against Bear Shield were later
dropped when it was revealed Steele had probably
died at the hands of GOON associates). The driver
of the car which struck the Eagle Hawk vehicle -
Albert Coomes, a white on-reservation rancher
who was allowed by the Wilsonites to serve as an
active GOON - also lost control of his car, went
into the ditch and was killed. Eugene Eagle Hawk,
who was badly injured but survived the crash,
identified a second occupant of the Coomes car as
being Mark Clifford, a prominent GOON. BIA and
FBI reports on the matter fail to make mention of
Clifford [who had survived and escaped the
scene].3 o
On other occasions, the Bureau investigated and
24. A 1974 GAO audit determined that the Wilson administra-
tion kept virtually no books on its expenditures of federal funds
and that there were clear implications of financial malfeasance.
See Brand, Johanna, The Life and Death of Anna Mae Aquash,
Lorimar Publishers, Toronto, 1978, p. 62. Also see U.S. Commis-
sion on Civil Rights, Report of Investigation: Oglala Sioux 7ribe, Gen-
eral Election, 1974, Rocky Mountain Regional Office, Denver,
October 1974; and Matthiessen, Peter, In the Spirit of Crazy Horse,
Viking Press, New York, 1984, p. 62.
25. It is estimated that at least $200,000 in tribal housing funds
were expended in 1973 and 1974 in acquiring house trailers uti-
lized exclusively by members of the GOON squad and their fami-
lies. See Brand, op. cit.
26. The per capita annual income on Pine Ridge during this pe-
riod was a little over $1,000. Wilson assigned himself a pay in-
crease from $5,500 to $15,500 per year, as well as a $30,000
annual "consultancy" with the tribe, within six months of taking
office. His wife was hired as director of the Pine Ridge Head Start
Program (which she shortly bankrupted) at $22,500 per year, his
brother Jim as director of tribal planning (where he was able to
identify and earmark funds for expenditure on the GOONs) at
$25,000 per year plus a $15,000 consultancy, and his brother
George as director of the tribal water works where he seems to
have functioned mainly as a GOON recruiter at $23,000 per year.
Wilson's son Manny as well as several cousins and nephews were
placed on the more covert sorts of retainer, serving as GOON
"soldiers" pure and simple. See Editors, Voices From I'ounded Knee,
1973, ..Ikwesasne .'otes, Mohawk Nation via Rooseveltown, NY,
1974. p. 21; McCall, Cheryl, "Life on Pine Ridge Bleak," Colorado
Daily, May 16, 1975; and .Vew York Times, April 22, 1975.
27. The percentage of BIA police who actually moonlighted as
GOONs in the classic fashion of the Latin American death squads
is somewhat nebulous. Speculations have ranged from 25 to 50%.
28. The area, located in the northwestern quadrant of Pine
Ridge got its name when it was "borrowed" by the U.S. Army Air
Corps in 1942 as a practice site for dive bombers and aerial gun-
ners. By agreement, the government was to return the land to
Oglala control at the end of World War II, but never did. Agita-
tion among Oglala traditionals to recover the gunnery range had
become pronounced by 1972 but, unbeknownst to any of the Indi-
ans involved, a secret cooperative venture undertaken by NASA
and the National Uranium Research and Evaluation Institute in
1970-71 had revealed through specialized satellite photography
that the area contained a rich uranium deposit, intermingled with
molybdenum (see Greis, J.P., Status of Mineral Resource Information
on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation, S.D., BIA Report No. 12, U.S.
Department of Interior, Washington, D.C., 1976). The title trans-
fer at issue was/is illegal under provision of the still-binding 1868
Fort Laramie Treaty, a stipulation requiring three-quarters ex-
press consent of all adult male Lakotas before any lawful land ces-
sion may take place.
29. The traditionals had formed the Oglala Sioux Civil Rights
Organization (OSCRO), headed by Pedro Bissonette, in 1972 as a
means to pursue recovery of the gunnery range, continue broader
land claims under the 1868 treaty, and resolve heirship problems
effecting reservation property owned by Pine Ridge residents but
administered "in trust" by the BIA. OSCRO naturally opposed
the Wilson agenda, and became the primary initial target of
GOON terrorism. The traditionals then attempted to exercise
their legal right of impeachment. The BIA responded by naming
Wilson to head up his own impeachment proceedings and re-
questing a 60 member Special Operations Group of SWAT-
trained U.S. Marshals - complete with flak vests and M-60
machine guns which they set up in sandbagged positions atop tri-
bal buildings - to "maintain order" during the travesty. Immedi-
ately after continuing himself in office, Wilson proclaimed a
reservation-wide ban on meetings of more than three people. It
was at this point that AIM was called in to provide support and
assistance.
30. Churchill and Vander Wall, op. cit., pp. 186-7.
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sometimes charged the victims themselves or their asso-
ciates with having perpetrated the violence directed
against them (with attendant publicity to establish the
"violence prone" characteristics of AIM).
On June 19, 1973, brothers (and AIM supporters)
Clarence and Vernal Cross were sitting in their car
by the side of the road near Pine Ridge [village]
when they began receiving rifle fire. Clarence died
of gunshot wounds. Vernal, severely injured [by a
bullet through the throat] but alive, was charged
by Delmar Eastman with the murder of his brother
(charges were later dropped). Nine-year-old Mary
Ann Little Bear, who was riding past the Cross car
in a vehicle driven by her father at the time of the
shooting, was struck in the face by a stray round,
suffering a wound which cost her an eye. Witnesses
named three GOONs - Francis Randall, John
Hussman and Woody Richards - as the gunmen
involved [but no investigation resulted].
3 '
The FBI's main complicity in the bloodbath was to
deliberately look the other way as the GOONs went
about their grisly work. However, there is ample evi-
dence that the Bureau's role was much more substantial.
For instance, the FBI repeatedly shielded the GOONs
from other governmental agencies in the area. During
the siege of Wounded Knee, U.S. Marshals on the scene
attempted to dismantle a GOON roadblock where an
FBI man was continuously present, according to the
Brewer interview. Chief U.S. Marshal Wayne Colburn
had decided that the occupants of the roadblock were
uncontrollable, and a menace to his own men. Richard
G. Held, head of the FBI Internal Security Section flew
to the site by helicopter to "straighten things out."
Held, assigned to the reservation as a "consultant," in-
formed the Chief U.S. Marshal that "the highest author-
ity" had orderd that the GOON roadblock was to
remain in place. Similarly, when several GOONs were
arrested by Colburn's deputies after pointing weapons
31. Ibid., p. 185. This is hardly the only incident in which inno-
cent bystanders were on the receiving end of GOON bullets. For
instance, on February 7, 1974, a round fired by an unidentified
GOON at AIM member Milo Goings in the reservation-adjacent
hamlet of Whiteclay, Nebraska missed and struck nine-year-old
Harold Weasel Bear in the face, blinding him in one eye. No FBI
investigation was opened.
32. The altercation at "The Residents' Roadblock" (as Wilson
called it), leld's part in it, and the FBI's intervention to obtain the
GOONs' release is described in Voices From l'ounded Knee, 1973,
op. cit., p. 123. Colburn's motive for attempting to dismantle the
roadblock is explained in a 1989 interview of former Solicitor
General Kent Frizzell by NPR reporter Scott Schlagle; Frizzell
states that he was riding in Colburn's car on April 23, 1973 when
they stopped at the GOON position. A Wilsonite, apparently in-
censed at the Justice Department's efforts to negotiate a cease fire
with AIM rather than unleashing the force necessary to kill
the "militants" outright, proceeded to shove the muzzle of his
weapon tinder Frizzell's chin and threatened to blow his head off.
Colburn was forced to get out of the car and level his own weapon
at the GOON, telling him to "go ahead and shoot Frizzell, and
then I'm going to kill you," before the GOON backed off. Colburn
then drove back to his command post in Pine Ridge village, as-
sembled as many deputies as he could muster, and returned to the
at both the chief marshal and U.S. Justice Department
Solicitor General Kent Frizzell, the FBI again inter-
vened, causing the men to be released prior to
booking.
32
More importantly, toward the end of the Wounded
Knee siege Colburn was actively disarming the GOONs
after it appeared that one of his men had been seriously
wounded by a round fired by the GOONs. Those
GOONs who were relieved of their hunting rifles and
shotguns (which until then had comprised their typical
weaponry) suddenly began to sport fully-automatic,
government-issue M-16 assault rifles.33 A much im-
proved inventory of explosive devices and an abundance
of ammunition also appeared among the GOONs dur-
ing this period. At about the same time, the GOONs ex-
perienced a marked upgrade in the quality of their
communications gear. They received scanners and
other electronic paraphernalia which allowed them to
monitor federal police frequencies. Finally, it appears
that the GOONs' operational intelligence underwent
considerable improvement during the 71 days of the
siege.
It is clear that the U.S. military provided no ord-
nance or other equipment directly to non-federal agen-
cies during the siege of Wounded Knee. It is also clear
that the U.S. Marshals, for reasons of their own, were
genuinely attempting to reduce rather than enhance
GOON weaponry while the siege was going on. In any
event, Colburn withdrew his Marshals as rapidly as pos-
sible from Pine Ridge in the aftermath of Wounded
Knee. This left the FBI as the only federal force on the
reservation from 1973 until mid-1975. In that same time
period - the period when the GOONs' activities be-
came increasingly lethal - both the quantity and the
quality of GOON firepower steadily increased. Many
reservation residents believe (and several researchers
have also concluded, by process of elimination) that the
FBI not only equipped, but also provided field intelli-
gence and other support to, the death squads operating
on Pine Ridge from 1973 through 1976.
34
roadblock in a fury. In his own interview, Duane Brewer refers to a
relative, BIA police officer/GOON Brian Brewer, leveling a
weapon at Colburn himself during the subsequent confrontation.
33. The marshal, Lloyd Grimm, was apparently hit in the lower
back by a round which permanently paralyzed him from the waist
down whilefacing the AIM perimeter at Wounded Knee. The bul-
let which struck him was not federal issue. This combination of
factors has caused considerable speculation that he may have been
hit by a round fired by a GOON from a position behind the fed-
eral lines. Concerning M-16s in the possession of GOONs during
the Wounded Knee siege, consider the following excerpt from
federal radio monitoring of radio traffic on the night of April 23,
1973: "Tribal Government /a euphemism for the GOOAVs] Roadblock to
Tribal Roving Patrol: How many M-16s you guys got? Where are
the other guys? Tribal Patrol to Tribal Roadblock: We got eight M-
16s and some men coming up on horseback..."
34. For researchers' conclusions, seeJohansen and Maestas, op.
cit.; Matthiessen, op. cit.; Agents of Repression, o). cit.; The COI.'TEL-
PRO Papers:, op. cit.; and Brand, op. cit. Also see Weyler, Rex, Blood
of the Land: The Governinental and Coiporate llar ..gaist the A tmerican
Indian lovenient, Vintage Books, New York, 1984; and Mes-
serschmidt, Jim, The Trial of Leonard Peltier, South End Press, Bos-
ton, 1983.
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THE BREWER REVELATIONS
Although much of what might have been covered
is not addressed in the existing interview with Duane
Brewer, what is included is often quite explicit. For in-
stance, he readily confirms the oft-leveled accusation
that in order to be employed on Pine Ridge during the
Wilson era, especially in the Tribal Rangers or Highway
Safety Program, one was virtually required to serve si-
multaneously as a GOON. As Brewer explained:
If you were a GOON, supported Dick Wilson,
and hated AIM, you had a pretty good chance of
getting a job [underwritten with federal funds].
[W]e had people from all over. Some of them you
never had to ask to do anything. They were ready
to do anything. A lot of them liked Dick Wilson
and his ideas. And they thought that was pretty
nice, a GOON squad. Hell, you don't see that very
often in this world. Of course, it is going on all
over the nation now, and different presidents and
leaders have their crew of people. And, you know,
I guess that's all, that's politics. You have your cer-
tain followers. But, in them days, you had real
dedicated people. They would hurt somebody for
their leader if they had to. And if anybody tried to
hurt him, [they] were too outnumbered to go mes-
sing around.
The GOONs were organized on a community-by-
community basis into "crews" of about a dozen men,
headed up by one or another of "ten to fifteen pretty
hard core individuals" such as Chuck and Emile
"Woody" Richards, and Wilson's eldest son, Manny
(Richard Jr.). 35 Brewer's crew-of which BIA police
SWAT team commander Marvin Stolt, Manny Wilson
and John Hussman served as operational lieutenants,
and which at its high point in 1975 rostered at least 22
other individuals-functioned more-or-less exclusively
on the western side of Pine Ridge. Chuck Richards'
group covered the northeastern quadrant of the reser-
vation, Woody Richards' the southeastern area. Ad hoc
units were formed from time to time. Combined opera-
tions between standing units occurred in all areas, as
needed.
The result of such organization was a relatively
constant reservation-wide fire-force of "about 100
men," with the capability of expanding to twice that
number. The GOONs themselves were augmented, not
only by the BIA police, but by non-Indian vigilante
groups such as the "Bennett County Citizens' Commit-
tee," "Charles Mix County Rangers," "Faith Chapter of
the John Birch Society," and other Bircher-oriented
"ranchers associations" in South Dakota, Wyoming and
Nebraska. At present, "maybe ten or so" of the hardest-
core GOON squad members have buried much of their
best weaponry, as well as ample stocks of ammunition
and explosives, around the reservation. They stand
ready, in Brewer's view, to resume their role as a nu-
cleus of GOON leadership "in case that's ever needed
again." They are motivated, he says, "by a lot of
hatred."
Brewer recalls that he and his underlings had "a
pretty good working relationship" with the federal
agents during the GOONs' formation period. This rela-
tionship emerged because his BIA police-GOON unit
served as a sort of regional roving patrol, dispensing a
bare-knuckled "law and order" against AIM on various
reservations.
During the time I was an officer, we traveled all
over the country following the Movement. We
went to the Treaty Convention up at Fort Yates.
We spent a lot of time in Rosebud. We went to
Fort Totten when they [AIM] took the jail over. It
was always Pine Ridge's little crew that went. So,
we kind of had a reputation. . .[U]sually when they
[the FBI] send you off like that . . . you don't cut
them [AIM] any slack. . . . you bust a few
heads.... you don't take any shit.. .You haul 'em
in. You show them authority because there is no
law and order... I got to travel quite a bit when I
was an officer. I enjoyed all of it.
36
Brewer's unit was used as an inter-reservation fire
brigade against AIM not merely because of their atti-
tudes towards "radicalism" and the appropriateness of
suppressing it through liberal applications of gratuitous
violence. It was also a conscious federal policy capitaliz-
ing on those GOON attitudes, to equip them for this
purpose.
[After a while] we had all the weaponry. We had
fifteen AR-15s. We had long-range projectile
smoke, [gas guns]. We had a [tear gas] fogger. We
had everything. So, it was our squad that usually
went. You get there, and you hear people say,
"The Pine Ridgers are here." So, of course, a
35. Chuck Richards is the eldest son in a clan so grotesquely
violent it is collectively referred to on Pine Ridge as the "Manson
Family." Chuck, predictably, is known as "Charlie Manson." He
was aiso Dick Wilson's son-in-law, before being sent to prison in
1978, presumably for holding a shotgun to the head of a tribal
police officer during a post-GOON era altercation on the reserva-
tion. While incarcerated at the minimum security federal facility at
Iompoc, California under an alias, he is believed to have been
involved in an assassination plot against Northwest AIM leader
Leonard Peltier, who had suddenly and unaccountably been trans-
ferred there directly from the "super-maximum" prison at
Marion, Illinois. Richards' younger brother Bennie, also a GOON,
had by then become head of the BIA police on the Duck Valley
Shoshoni Reservation, on the Nevada/Idaho border. He is sus-
pected of involvement in the mass murder of AIM President John
Trudell's entire family - wife Tina, daughters Ricarda Star (age
five) and Sunshine Karma (age three), son Eli Changing Sun (age
one), and mother-in-law Leah Hicks Manning - on the night of
February 12, 1979.
36. Brewer's reference to a "Treaty Convention up at Fort
Yates," on the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation, concerns the
founding conference of the International Indian Treaty Council,
AIM's diplomatic arm, in June of 1974. "Pine Ridge's little crew"
was also on hand at Standing Rock on June 8, 1975, when AIM
leader Russell Means was shot in the back and nearly killed by BIA
police.
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number of times we went to places, some officers
busted heads.. .We had some pretty cocky guys, I
guess you might say.
Brewer contends that the FBI's support of the
GOONs was motivated by the fact that they had a com-
mon cause- undermining AIM. In his words, "the FBI
was with the GOONs" because "we was fighting in the
same thing - we wasn't supporting AIM." Asked
whether this meant the FBI "looked the other way"
when GOONs engaged in physical assaults upon AIM
members, he replied somewhat disengenuously that "we
never, ever done anything with them [agents] around,
but they probably would have ... So anything we could
get away with, we would." '3
7
I had a good relationship with them [the FBI] be-
cause I helped them a lot. . . .Yeah, we wasn't
afraid [of being arrested.] . . . I probably have
maybe four or five FBI agents who are real good
friends. They tried to get me into the FBI Acad-
emy, tried to help me out, to get me out of this
place.
Intelligence with which to conduct the anti-AIM
operations was no problem because "the agents would
come to my house [and] give [us] all kinds of informa-
tion and things. . . they were probably giving [the
GOONs] a lot more than they were supposed to. Which
is good, hell, every little bit helps." Basically, "we could
get information from them" whenever it was needed.
Asked whether the FBI thought it was "okay to rough up
AIM supporters," Brewer responded, "I imagine they
did.. .I think they did.. .They never did investigate any
of them incidents [of GOON violence]." At another
point, in response to a similar question, he replied that
when the FBI brought information to his house, it was
because "they wanted to see us go out and educate"
AIM members and supporters; "I got the feeling they
was hoping that I'd kick the shit out of somebody. Or
have a war."
Brewer offered the concept of "butt kickin" to ex-
plain the term "educate" in the context he was using it,
and thus the sort of activities the FBI had tacitly en-
dorsed. "We would educate them, like I said, we would
kick their butt. Then they ain't going to come around
and bug you any more." He went on to explain that the
intended result of an "educational butt kickin" was for
the victim to "know that any time they move any part of
their body it hurts 'em, [and] it could have been worse.
I've educated a few who will never forget me."
I think ["education" occurs] when you . .. give
them a severe beating and, like I said, you don't
cut no slack. You beat their face, you beat their
arms and legs, and work them over good. So, like I
said, when they wake up the next day, every time
they move they're going to think about you and
decide whether they want to come back and mess
with you again.... And, you know, you do it good
enough and they're not going to be thinking about
coming back for more of the pain. They're going
to forget about it.
The GOONs' repertoire of "educational" tech-
niques was often even more extreme. At one point,
Brewer recounts how a GOON named Sonny Dion
"beat this [AIM] guy up so bad and then he used a saw
and was trying to saw this guy up." Other GOONs, ap-
parently shocked at the extent to which Dion was "get-
ting out of hand," intervened to prevent consummation
of this macabre act. Brewer goes on to note that Dion
was eventually "shipped out" - that is, he was charged
by the BIA police and eventually sent to federal prison
- not for his murderous assault upon the AIM member,
but for turning his brutal attentions upon another
GOON, Chauncey Folsom, shooting him six times in the
back with a .22 caliber revolver (the victim lived).
For his part, Brewer points out, Folsom was a key
player in a notorious event occurring on February 27,
1975 at the Pine Ridge airport. In this incident, some
fifteen carloads of GOONs headed by Tribal President
Dick Wilson himself surrounded an automobile occu-
pied by Bernard Escamilla, an AIM member charged
with several offenses during the Wounded Knee siege,
his legal counsel, National Lawyers Guild attorney
Roger Finzel, and two paralegal assistants, Eva Gordon
and Kathi James.3 8 Wilson ordered the GOONs to
"stomp" their quarry. Thereupon, Brewer admits, he
personally led the charge, smashing the car's wind-
shield. Other GOONs, whom Brewer does not identify,
sliced open the top of the car (it was a convertible),
dragged Finzel and Escamilla out and, according to a
Rapid City Journal article published the following day,
"stomped, kicked and pummeled [them] to the ground.
[GOONs] took turns kicking and stomping, while one
slashed Finzel's face with a knife, [also] cutting Eva
Gordon's hand as she attempted to shield him." Fol-
som, who, as Brewer put it, "was a really huge guy,"
proceeded to "educate" Escamilla, a much smaller man,
"beat him up real bad, and then just sort of dumped him
in a ditch full of water. Things kind of got out of hand, I
guess."
No federal charges were ever filed against Wilson
or any of his GOONs in this matter, although Finzel and
Gordon provided detailed and mutually supporting
depositions, naming several of their assailants.3 a9 In-
stead, the FBI busied itself administering polygraph ex-
37. In fact, FBI were "around," at least on some occasions. For
example, on February 26, 1973, AIM leader Russell Means, ac-
companied by reservation residents Milo Goings and Pedro Bis-
sonette, attempted to meet with Dick Wilson in a last ditch effort
to avert the confrontation which became the siege of Wounded
Knee only 24 hours later. For their trouble, they were assaulted in
the parking lot of the tribal office building by five GOONs headed
by Duane Brewer. At least two FBI agents were on hand as "ob-
servers." No further action was taken by the Bureau.
38. Finzel, Gordon and James were members of the Wounded
Knee Legal Defense/Offense Committee (WKLD/OC), a National
Lawyers Guild project initiated during the 1973 Wounded Knee
siege to provide legal counsel to AIM members and supporters.
39. Aside from Dick Wilson, the victims identified GOONs
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aminations to the victims (which they easily passed).
Wilson, meanwhile, had conducted a press conference
in which he claimed to know nothing about the incident
other than that the violence had been caused by "Rus-
sell Means and a large group of followers, last seen
heading east out of Pine Ridge" village.4 0 When they
were nonetheless indicted by a federal grand jury, Wil-
son and his men quickly pleaded guilty to a misde-
meanor charge in tribal court (the judges of which
Wilson himself had appointed) and were assessed $10
fines. Assistant U.S. Attorney Bill Clayton thereupon an-
nounced that no federal prosecutions would be initiated
because any felony charges brought by his office would
constitute "double jeopardy." When asked by interview-
ers whether the whole thing hadn't been whitewashed,
as critics have long contended, Brewer relied: "Yeah, I
guess maybe it was."
41
At one point the former GOON leader denies hav-
ing personally killed anyone: "No, I never did. I never
did kill anybody. Like I said, I might have smoked them
up pretty bad where they thought they were gonna die.
But I never did really kill them." However, he also says,
"I've come close, I think .... I've beat some people with
clubs that I was worried wouldn't live," and "I worried
the few times that I did kill somebody [emphasis added]."
Further, he readily admits that the GOONs as a whole
did regularly commit homicide.42 Certain of these "in-
cidents" concern the much rumored murder of at least
thirteen individuals engaged in transporting supplies
through GOON and federal lines during the 1973 siege
of Wounded Knee.
I don't know if they killed them on the spot. Be-
cause, like I said, there would be witnesses. More
likely, they took them off by themselves ... I know
that there was one group of guys [Woody Rich-
ards' crew] that had that roadblock that done a guy
in pretty bad just beatin' him with a
weapon ... [T]hey ended up really pistol whippin'
him and usin' weapons on him... I've never heard
of them ever taking a guy to the hospital as bad as
he was beat up. . .He was probably killed
somewhere.
43
A customary GOON squad practice was to conduct
drive-by shootings of the homes of movement people:
"You know, if there was too many AIM members there,
or something, maybe [the GOONs] would take a cruise
by and shoot them up." Often, Brewer recalls "we
would set it up" so that drive-bys "would be blamed on
AIM." 
4 4
I know it was done quite a bit. Any time' [AIM]
gathered up... [the GOONs hit] the AIM people. A
lot of times we had a' little war. Somebody would
go by and they would open up. I guess the housing
[project] that was really the one that was shot up
the most was probably, Cherry Hills. . . . [That's
where the majority of the AIM supporters lived so]
it was shot up a lot. Them houses are a real mess.
Cherry Hill was not the only target: "I know [the
GOONs] firebombed a house in Crazy Horse [housing
project] once because one of the guys that lived there
was an AIM supporter." Brewer also acknowledges that
it was GOONs who, on March 3, 1973, firebombed the
home ofjournalist Aaron DeSersa and his wife, Betty, in
order to "send a message" that they should suspend
publication of an anti-Wilson tabloid based in the reser-
vation village of Manderson. Betty DeSersa Was badly
burned in the ensuing blaze. Among other targets of
GOON firebombings were the home of elderly tradi-
tional Oglala Lakota Chief Frank Fools Crow 'on Mirch
5, 1975, 'and that of his assistant, Matthew King, on
March 3. The home of AIM member Severt Young Bear,
near the reservation hamlet of Porcupine, was shot up
on at least six occasions and firebombed twice in little
more than a year.4
5
Duane, Brian and Vincent Brewer, Chuck, Cliff, Bennie and
Woody Richards, Mark and Greg Clifford, Llloyd and Toby Eagle
Bull, Robert Ecoffey, Johnson Holy Rock, Bennett "Tuffy" Sierra,
John Hussman, Glenn Little Bird, Marvin Stolt, Glenn Three
Stars,James Wedell, Michael Weston, Dale Janis, Charlie Winters,
Salty Twiss, Manny and Billy Wilson, Fred Two Bulls, and Francis
Randall as being among their fifty-odd attackers.
40. Quoted in the Rapid City Journal, February 28, 1975.
41. A further perspective has been offered in an interview by
former WKLD/OC coordinator Ken'Tilsen: "Somebody had to
tell Dick Wilson how to go about beating the rap on this one. He
wasn't smart enough to figure out the double jeopardy ploy-all by
himself. And you can bet that 'somebody' was in the U.S. Attor-
nev's office or the FBI."
42. For instance, AIM supporter Phillip Little Crow was beaten
to death as part of a GOON "educational seminar" on November
10, 1973; AIM supporter Jim Little was stomped to death by four
GOONs on September 10, 1975; AIM member Hobart Horse was
beaten, shot and run over repeatedly by a car on March I, 1976.
No one went to trial on any of these murders.
43. The late Robert Burnette, at the time tribal president of the
Rosebud Sioux, has recounted how, immediately after the
Wounded Knee siege ended, "[Solicitor General] Kent Friz-
zell... called me to request that I come to Wounded Knee with
two FBI agents in an attempt to find eight graves that were around
the perimeter. The activists who spoke of these graves believed
they contained the bodies of Indians murdered by white ranchers
or Wilson's men [or both]." (see Burnette, Robert, with John Kos-
ter, The Road to Wlounded Knee, Bantam Books, New York, 1974, p.
248). The Akwesasne .Votes book, 'oices From Wlounded Knee, 1973
(op. cit., p. 193) also contains an excerpt from the verbatim tran-
scription of U.S. Marshal radio logs for the night in which it is
reported that a GOON "roving patrol" had captured a group of
13 "hippies" attempting to backpack supplies into Wounded
Knee. A BIA police unit dispatched by the marshals to take cus-
tody of the prisoners was fired upon by the GOONs and retreated.
None of the prisoners was ever seen again. All told, the cumula-
tive number of individuals believed by AIM to be missing as a re-
sult of their attempts to move in or out of Wounded Knee during
the siege exceeds forty.
44. During the course of his interview, he drove reporters
through the Cherry Hill Housing Project, where "a lot of AIM
people used to live," pointing out specific dwellings which had
been shot up and/or firebombed by GOON patrols.
45. In late 1974, Young' Bear requested that an AIM security
unit be placed on his property in much the shme fashion the
Northwest AIM group subsequently established its defensive en-
campment at the request of the Jumping Bull family, near Oglala.
As a result, GOON violence directed at Young Bear's home
"dropped off real fast," as he remembers it.
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Yet another noteworthy incident occurred on No-
vember 17, 1975, when BIA police officer/GOON Jesse
Trueblood shot up an "AIM house" belonging to
Chester and Bernice Stone in Oglala, another reserva-
tion village. He seriously wounded all five occupants
and permanently maimed two of them, an adult named
Louis Tyon and three-year-old Johnny Mousseau.
Trueblood himself was found dead in his patrol car
shortly thereafter, shot in the back of the head with his
own service revolver. The FBI, incredibly, listed the
cause of death as "suicide." Brewer concurs that the
federal finding was absurd - "Jesse had a disability
which prevented him from lifting his arms in such a way
that he could've shot himself like that" - but says he
has "no idea" who did the killing. It is commonly ac-
cepted around Oglala that Trueblood was murdered by
a prominent GOON leader (not Brewer), who availed
himself of the opportunity presented by the confusion
attending the drive-by to settle a romantic dispute with
his colleague.
When asked about the source of the increasingly
sophisticated weaponry the GOONs came to possess,
Brewer suggests repeatedly that the FBI armed his
group - both directly and through indirect conduits -
with items such as Thompson submachine guns and M-
16s. "It looked like it was probably police stuff, [and] it
was always cheap when we got it. It included more than
ammunition and automatic weapons. [There were
p]lastic explosives, det[onation] cord, [and] fragmenta-
tion grenades," as well as dynamite and blasting caps
were given to the GOONs. He contends that certain of
the less exotic - but nonetheless expensive -weapons
used by the GOONs, such as .300 Weatherby rifles
(ideal for sniping purposes), were provided at little or
no charge by white vigilante groups. Some of the M-16s,
he says, came from BIA police inventories provided by
the federal government. Most of the rest of the hard-to-
get gear came in clandestine fashion from FBI person-
nel and/or "black drug-gun dealers" in Rapid City
motel rooms, usually at the local Holiday Inn.
[Y]ou'd go to their room with this big suitcase and
[they'd] show you a bunch of weapons, grenades,
det cord, blasting caps, whatever, and give you
some. "Here, take this." A couple guys I know of
walked around with blasting caps in their shirt
pockets.
In those instances where the "Black gun dealers"
transfered weapons and explosives to the GOONs,
46. It is worth noting that there were no African American gun
dealers in Rapid City - or anywhere else in western South Dakota
or adjoining areas of Wyoming and Nebraska - in those days, and
still aren't. The individuals in question were therefore necessarily
"imported" from some considerable distance in order to conduct
their clandestine commerce. If the whole thing were a profit-mak-
ing venture on their part, this might be understandable. But
Brewer says repeatedly that they provided weapons and munitions
to the GOONs either free of charge or at extremely low cost. So,
the question of why a group of Black men might undertake consid-
erable effort and expense for no potential return in order to pro-
agents were in the motel, monitoring the activity. 46
When asked whether the agents were aware that the
GOONs were in possession of such illegal parapherna-
lia, Brewer responded, "Sure." As an illustration, he re-
counted an occasion when, with FBI agents in adjoining
rooms, a GOON, "playing" with a newly-acquired
weapon accidentally discharged it in the Holiday Inn,
blowing a hole in the floor. The Bureau conducted no
investigation, nor did they take any other action. Brewer
also mentions repeatedly that he routinely showed FBI
agents visiting his home the illegal weapons in his per-
sonal possession, and he often informed them how he
planned to use the weapons. Such displays failed to
evoke a negative response - never mind an arrest -
from the agents. To the contrary, they customarily ad-
vised him to "be careful" as he went about his business.
At another point Brewer explains that after he en-
gaged in a fist fight with AIM leader Russell Means, the
FBI rewarded him with "a .357 magnum, 6-inch bar-
rel. . . [worth] three hundred and some bucks, brand
new. Real nice. I carried that a long time."' 47 He also
states categorically that the FBI supplied the GOONs
with special types of "armor piercing ammunition,"
which was "real expensive" and supposedly "restricted
to law enforcement personnel," so the gunmen could
hit their AIM targets even if "they were in a brick build-
ing or something." This led to a question concerning
"the best way to hit a house," to which the GOON
leader responded:
Best way to hit it is probably just to .. .have your
lookouts and when there is nobody around and it's
nice and quiet, have your . . .assault car with all
the weapons in it. And do it from the road. Don't
cruise up to the house because then you got return
fire. Then you got a war. The point of shooting up
a house was just to prove that we didn't approve of
[AIM] gathering, you know, and we wantted] them
to know that we're on our toes and watching them.
When asked why the Bureau might provide - or
arrange provision of - so much costly [weaponry] to an
irregular force like the GOONs, Brewer was unequivo-
cal: "They just didn't want them [AIM] people to sur-
vive .. .I think they was hoping that we would just kill
them all, you know?"
The former "Head GOON" offers considerable
perspective on the FBI's "inability to cope" with the
wave of violent death on Pine Ridge. Take, for example,
one of the more mysterious homicides involved in the
vide one group of Indians the means to slaughter another remains
inexplicable on its face. This remains true unless one considers
the probability that they were serving as go-betweens for some
one else - say, a federal agency - and compensated accordingly:
The scenario fits well with the remainder of Brewer's commentary
on arms transactions, and with the known means by which the Bu-
reau armed the Secret Army Organization in southern California
at about the same time. See Parenti, Michael, Democray for the Few,
St. Martin's Press, New York, 1982, p. 24.
47. This concerns the altercation outside the tribal office build-
ing in Pine Ridge village on February 26, 1973.
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entire reign of terror on the reservation, that ofJeanette
Bissonette - a not especially prominent activist - at
about I a.m. on the morning of March 27, 1975. Careful
observers suspected at the time that the victim was mis-
takenly killed by a GOON sniper who confused her car
with a similar one driven by traditionalist leader and
AIM supporter Ellen Moves Camp. The FBI, for reasons
it has never adequately explained, insisted that the kill-
ing "must" have been done by "militants" and ex-
pended a great deal of investigative energy attempting
to link Northwest AIM leader Leonard Peltier to the
crime. However, Brewer frames the matter a bit
differently.
I know there was [innocent] people killed during
that time, like that Bissonette lady down . . . near
Oglala. We didn't do that type of stuff [ordinarily].
That was, must have been, a freak accident. They
must have mistaken her for somebody else. I think
that's what happened. But, you know, the weapon
we used to kill that woman was also a weapon [pro-
vided by the FBI].
He also provides an interesting interpretation of
what the FBI described as the "justifiable homicide" of
AIM supporter Pedro Bissonette (brother ofJeanette) at
a police roadblock near Pine Ridge village on the night
of October 17, 1973. Brewer suggests that the killer,
BIA police officer/GOON Joe Clifford, may have been
not so much politically motivated as he was enraged by
the fact that Bissonette had undergone a stormy mar-
riage to his sister: "They had a real fiery romance, I
guess. And it didn't end well. So maybe there was
enough hatred [on the part of] this officer to, enough to
end the guy's life... Maybe [Clifford] was worried that
[Bissonette] was coming back to raise hell with his sister
or something." In either event, whether it was moti-
vated politically or for a personal grudge, the killing
plainly added up to murder rather than the "self-de-
fense" explanation officially registered by the FBI, and
confirmed by government contract coroner W.O.
Brown .4
8
Concerning the murder of AIM supporter Byron
DeSersa near the reservation hamlet of Wanblee on Jan-
uary 30, 1976, Brewer states that he did not participate
48. The cause of death listed in both the police report and cor-
oner's report in the Pedro Bissonette slaying is also suspect. The
time of the shooting reported by Clifford is 9:48 p.m., the time of
the body's arrival by ambulance at the Pine Ridge hospital (a few
minutes distance from the shooting scene) is 10:10, making it ap-
pear that the victim died more or less instantly from gunshot
wounds. Several eyewitnesses who happened on the roadblock,
however, contend that Bissonette was shot at approximately 9
p.m. This would mean the victim was left on the ground for nearly
an hour before an ambulance was called, and likely bled to death.
Such a possibility may explain why Delmar Eastman, acting on in-
structions from AUSA Bill Clayton, ordered the body secretly re-
moved from the Pine Ridge morgue at 3 a.m. on the morning after
the killing, and taken to Scottsbluff, Nebraska, where the autopsy
was performed by Brown. See Agents of Repression, op. cit., pp. 200-
3, 206-Il.
49. DeSersa was hit in the left thigh by a bullet fired from one
of lour carloads of GOONs pursuing his own vehicle in a high
directly, since the locale was outside his normal area of
operations. On the other hand, he candidly acknowl-
edges providing "some of the weapons" used by GOON
leader Chuck Richards, Dick Wilson's younger son,
Billy, and others in committing the crime. Still, he holds
his silence about the implications of two FBI agents ar-
riving on the scene shortly after the murder, being in-
formed by witnesses as to the identity of the killers (who
were still assembled close at hand), and then making no
arrests. Similarly, he stands mute with regard to the sig-
nificance of Delmar Eastman's subsequent dispatch of a
BIA police unit, not to arrest DeSersa's murderers, but
to remove them safely from Wanblee when it became
apparent that area residents might retaliate.
49
On the matter of the execution-style slaying of
AIM activist Anna Mae Aquash, whose body was found
in a ravine near Wanblee on February 24, 1976, Brewer
admits that there is strong evidence pointing to BIA po-
lice investigator (and GOON affiliate) Paul Herman as
the killer. But, as Brewer puts it, the FBI couldn't "tie
him in" to the Aquash murder because the nature of her
death failed to conform to Herman's peculiar mode of
killing.
[Herman] got sent off [to prison] shortly after that.
He killed a young girl, burnt her with cigarette
butts, just done a whole bunch of things. Anna
Mae Aquash, she wasn't done like that. She was
shot... if this guy was a maniac and burnt his vic-
tims with a cigarette and done things, why didn't
he do it to [Aquash]?... She wasn't you know, sex-
ual[ly] tortured, none of it, none of that stuff. Just
a clean death.
The problem with such reasoning is striking.
Although government contract coroner W.O. Brown -
whose conclusions in this case Brewer apparently
wished his interviewers to accept - failed to find evi-
dence that Aquash had been tortured or sexually
abused, he also "determined" that she had died of "ex-
posure. '"50 Independent pathologist Garry Peterson, re-
tained by the victim's family to perform a second
autopsy, concluded immediately that her death had
been caused by a "lead slug consistent with a .32 or .38
caliber handgun... fired pointblank into the base of the
speed chase outside Wanblee. It severed the femoral artery and he
bled to death in a ditch while the GOONs pursued his passengers
through open fields. Charlie Winters, one of the assailants, was
subsequently arrested for the crime by local police in nearby Mar-
tin, South Dakota. This led to a state (not federal) case in which
not only Winters, but Chuck Richards, Billy Wilson and DaleJanis
were charged. Despite the fact that DeSersa and his companions
had been unarmed, charges were dismissed against Richards and
Wilson on the basis of their having acted in "self-defense." Win-
ters and Janis were then allowed to plea bargain to second degree
manslaughter and eventually served two years apiece. Neither the
FBI nor the BIA police played any constructive role in obtaining
even this minimal outcome.
50. Inexplicably, the FBI lab notes concerning Aquash (one of
which is reproduced in The COIVTELPRO Papers, op. cit., p. 293),
refer to the cause of death as neither "natural" or "homicide," but
as "possible manslaughter."
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brain." Peterson also observed that the victim appeared
to have been "beaten" and that there was "evidence of
sexual contact" shortly before she was murdered. This
weakens Brewer's contention that the Aquash murder
was "out of character" with Paul Herman's lethal style.
It says even more by implication about the FBI's posi-
tion on the matter- announced even before its conclu-
sion in the Herman investigation was officially reached
- that the victim was "probably" killed by her "AIM
associates," ostensibly because she was "suspected of
being a government informant."
'5'
At present, the FBI's investigation of AIM's possi-
ble involvement in the murder of Anna Mae Pictou
Aquash is officially ongoing, which exempts the Bureau
from legal requirements that it disclose relevant docu-
ments to researchers. Meanwhile, by its own admission,
it never got around to interviewing coroner Brown as to
how he arrived at his cause of death finding. 52 Nor has it
bothered to question two of its agents, Tom Green and
William Wood, as to why they decided it was necessary
to sever the victim's hands and ship them to the FBI fin-
gerprint lab for post mortum identification purposes. In
the alternative, they might have instructed Dr. Brown to
conduct a much more conventional cranial x-ray, for
purposes of identification by dental chart comparison
(but, of course, this would have instantly disclosed the
bullet lodged in the victim's skull). 53 Finally, the Bu-
reau's sleuths have failed to interrogate agent David
Price, who, by several accounts, had threatened
Aquash's life during a 1975 interrogation session. 54
By the spring of 1975, the level of GOON violence
on Pine Ridge was so pronounced - and the lack of FBI
response so conspicuous - that local traditionals re-
quested that AIM undertake a policy of armed self-de-
fense (in order that opposition to Wilson might
continue). AIM responded by establishing defensive en-
campments on properties owned by traditionals at vari-
ous points around the reservation. Substantial evidence
derived from FBI internal documents suggests that the
Bureau seized upon this situation as affording the op-
portunity to provoke an incident spectacular enough to
bring about public acceptance of another massive
paramilitary invasion of Pine Ridge.5 5 Deployment of
hundreds of agents in an extremely aggressive capacity,
it was thought, would prove sufficient to finally break
the backs of AIM and its supporters, already weakened
by the war of attrition waged against them during the
two years since Wounded Knee.
A camp set up by the Northwest AIM Group on the
Jumping Bull family property, near Oglala, was selected
as the target for the catalyzing confrontation. Two
agents, Ron Williams and Jack Coler, were sent there
during the late morning of June 26, 1975, and opened
fire on several of the Indians they encountered. Almost
immediately, the lead elements of a large and already-
assembled force of more than a hundred agents, BIA
SWAT personnel and GOONs attempted to force their
way onto the property. From that point, things seem to
have gone somewhat awry from the Bureau point of
view. Many more AIM members were present than an-
ticipated, and the government reinforcements beat a
hasty retreat to the cover of roadside ditches while
Coler and Williams were cut off from their expected
support. In the extended firefight which followed, both
agents were killed, as was an AIM member named Joe
Stuntz Killsright. Despite the presence of perhaps 200
police personnel, GOONs and white vigilantes by mid-
afternoon, the remaining AIM members escaped.
56
Despite this undoubtedly unanticipated outcome,
the Oglala firefight served its intended purpose for the
FBI. Public endorsement of the sort of "crushing blow"
desired by Bureau strategists inevitably resulted from
51. Indeed, the Bureau caused an article, headlined "FBI de-
nies AIM implication that Aquash was informant," to appear in
the March 11, 1976 edition of the Rapid City Journal. No one in
AIM had implied that she was. Hence, the appearance is that the
Bureau was deliberately attempting to create a public impression
of its own. Bob Robideau, a member of the Northwest AIM
Group, of which Aquash was also a part, states categorically that
she was neither an informer nor suspected of being one. Rumors
had been raised to that effect by FBI infiltrator/provocateur
Douglass Durham nearly a year earlier. These had, according to
Robideau, been "checked out" by AIM Security, and she had been
immediately "cleared." Former AIM leaders John Trudell and
Dennis Banks concur with Robideau's assessment of the situation.
On Durham, see Giese, Paula, "Profile of an Informer," Covert Ac-
tion Information Bulletin, No. 24, Summer 1985.
52. FBI representative James Frier was grilled by California
Congressman Don Edwards on this topic during appropriation
hearings in 1980. Frier's responses were deemed "less than satis-
factory" by this former FBI agent turned legislator. See U.S.
House of Representatives, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the Committee of theJudiciary: First Session on
FBIAuthorization (1981), 97th Congress, 1st Session, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1980, p. 666.
53. See analysis by Aquash's attorney, Bruce Ellison, and for-
mer AIM leader John Trudell in Annie Mae: A Brave-Hearted l'oman,
op. cit. For excerpts from an independent researcher's interview
with Brown, see Brand, op. cit., pp. 21-2.
54. Price was one of the agents who atypically gathered to view
Aquash's "unidentified" body in situ. He then, even more atypi-
cally, accompanied the body more than 100 miles to the morgue
at the Pine Ridge hospital, and professed to be unable to recog-
nize the victim in either location. Morgue photos of the body, ob-
served by the author (who never met her), are clearly identifiable
as being of Anna Mae Aquash. As Congress subsequently put it:
"SA Price had had personal contact with Ms. Aquash in the past
and assisted in photographing the body at the PHS morgue on
February 25, 1976. SA Price's previous contacts with Ms. Aquash
occurred when he interviewed her in connection with an FBI in-
vestigation in the early spring of 1975 and again in September
1975. [On the latter occasion] she was arrested by agents of the
FBI, one of whom was SA Price" (see First Session on FBI Authoriza-
tion (1981), op. cit., p. 278). Concerning death threats, see McKier-
nan, Kevin, "Indian woman's death raises many troubling
questions," Minneapolis Tribune, May 30, 1976, especially quota-
tions from WKLD/OC researcher Candy Hamilton. Also see
Churchill, Ward, "Who Killed Anna Mae?" Zeta, December 1988.
55. There is, for example, a report entitled "Law Enforcement
on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation," dated June 6, 1975, which
calls for "massive military assault forces." A later memorandum,
excerpted into a press release entitled "RESMURS Press Cover-
age Clarification" (July 8, 1975), calls for "automatic and semiau-
tomatic weapons" deployment among the assault forces, as well as
"heavy equipment such as armored personnel carriers."
56. These events are covered extremely well in Matthiessen, op.
cit., pp.-.
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the incident, especially after it had been "packaged" by
Bureau propagandists. Hence, before nightfall on June
26, counterintelligence expert Richard G. Held - de-
tached from his normal duties before the firefight and
standing by in Minneapolis, ready to assume command
of the Pine Ridge operation - was on site.5 7 With him
were Norman Zigrossi- a young counterintelligence
protig6; his son, Richard Wallace Held, head of the
FBI's COINTELPRO (CounteriNTELligence PRogram)
Section in Los Angeles, and a number of other special-
ists in "political work." 5 8 They "hit the ground mov-
ing," to borrow a phrase from the vernacular of their
trade.
By the morning ofJune 27, SWAT teams imported
from Chicago, Minneapolis, Milwaukee and Quantico,
Virginia were on the reservation, giving the Bureau a
military-style presence. This force came complete with
armored personnel carriers, Bell "Huey" helicopters
and other Vietnam-type equipment of some 250 agents
(as O'Clock mentioned above, this number had swelled
to 350 by mid-July). For the next several months, this
huge force conducted sweeps back and forth across Pine
Ridge, abruptly kicking in doors to perform warrantless
searches, making arbitrary arrests, and engaging in air
assaults upon assorted centers of AIM resistance, all in
the process of conducting what the FBI called its
"RESMURS (for REservation MuRders) Investiga-
tion." 59 Subjected to these sorts of official tactics, the
AIM leadership reversed its position, quietly withdraw-
ing from the reservation as an expedient to relieving the
pressure imposed upon their traditional allies.
The firelight ultimately served much broader pur-
poses as well. "Under the volatile circumstances caused
by the deaths of Agents Coler and Williams," the Senate
Select Committee on Government Operations (the so-
called "Church Committee"), which had already issued
the first subpoenas for a scheduled probe into the sorts
57. Concerning Held's prepositioning in Minneapolis, see June
27, 1975 memorandum, Gebhart to O'Connell, reproduced at p.
267 of The COINTELPRO Papers, op. cit.
58. Concerning Richard Wallace Held's involvement in the
RESMURS operation from.its first moments, and his eventual
presence on Pine Ridge - both of which he and the Bureau have
denied - see the documents reproduced at pp. 268-70 of The
COIXTELPRO Papers, op. cit.
59. One result of these tactics was the death of an elderly man
named James Brings Yellow, who was startled into a fatal heart
attack when a team of agents headed by J. Gary Adams suddenly
kicked in his door on July 10, 1975. Air assaults included a raid on
the property of AIM member Selo Black Crow, near Wanblee, on
July 8 (50 agents involved), and another on the property of AIM
spiritual leader Leonard Crow Dog on September 5, 1975 (100
agents involved).
60. The Senate Select Committee had issued a subpoena to FBI
agent provocateur Douglass Durham, to begin hearings as of mid-
July 1975. The proceedings were called off on July 3 by a letter
from committee staff member Patrick Shae to Attorney General
Edward S. Levi stating in part: "[W]e will hold in abeyance any
action in view of the killing of the Agents at Pine Ridge Reserva-
tion, South Dakota."
61. The preliminary document was signed by Wilson on June
29, 1975. Another, improved version was signed on January 2,
1976, shortly before Wilson left office. Congress then duly con-
secrated the arrangement as Public Law 90-468. When the legiti-
of activities encompassed by the FBI's anti-AIM cam-
paign, especially those on Pine Ridge, agreed to an "in-
definite postponement" of its hearings. 61 ' In actuality,
this exploration of the Bureau's repressive behavior in
what has been called its "post-COINTELPRO era" was
simply and permanently shelved by the committee (or,
in any event, it still has not started 16 years later). And,
a few days after the firefight, the U.S. Department of In-
terior felt the time was "appropriate" for Dick Wilson to
finally sign the instrument transferring title of the Sheep
Mountain Gunnery Range to the National Forest
Service.
6 1
The Bureau and its supporters have always con-
tended that no government plan to provoke a confron-
tation existed. The presence of large numbers of
GOONs and BIA police in close proximity to the remote
location in which the firefight occurred was, they say,
the sheerest of coincidences, proving nothing at all.
AIM, FBI media liaison Tom Coil initially claimed, was
"the group with the plan," having "lured" the agents
into a "carefully prepared ambush" where they were
"fired upon with automatic weapons" from a "sophisti-
cated bunker complex," "riddled with fifteen to twenty
bullets" apiece, "dragged from their cars" and
"stripped" and - in one version - "scalped." Coil
even quoted Williams' last words, having the dead agent
plead for his life, begging his "cold-blooded execution-
ers" to "please remember my wife and children before
you do this."
6 2
After FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley finally ad-
mitted that none of this was true, the Bureau switched to
the story that it maintains to this day: Coler and Wil-
liams were merely attempting to serve a "routine war-
rant" on a 19-year-old AIM member named Jimmy
Eagle and ended up being brutally murdered for their
trouble.6 3 Duane Brewer tells a rather different story.
macy of this measure was subsequently challenged on the basis of
treaty requirements, P.L. 90-468 was amended so that surface
rights might revert to the Lakotas at any time they determined by
referendum to recover them (thus neatly reversing the treaty stip-
ulation), but leaving subsurface (i.e., mineral) rights under perma-
nent federal ownership. See Huber, Jacqueline, et al., The Gunnery
Range Report, Oglala Sioux Tribe, Office of the President, Pine
Ridge, S.D., 1981.
62. For analysis, see Weisman,Joel D., "About that 'Ambush' at
Wounded Knee," Columbia Journalism Review, September-October
1975. Also see Churchill, Ward, "Renegades, Terrorists and Rev-
olutionaries: The Government's Propaganda War Against the
American Indian Movement," Propaganda Review, No. 4, April
1989.
63. FBI Director Kelley "corrected misimpressions" at a press
conference conducted at the Century Plaza Hotel in Los Angeles
on July 1, 1975, an event timed to coincide with the funerals of
Williams and Coler. The major problems with the Bureau's re-
placement story are that the warrant allegedly being served on
Jimmy Eagle is dated July 7, nearly two weeks after the firefight
(and, for that matter, a week after Kelley's press conference), and
is for the petty theft of a pair of used cowboy boots rather than
"kidnapping and assault" as the Bureau originally informed the
press. Even taken at face value, the scenario places the FBI in a
posture of assigning two agents the weighty task of pursuing an
teenaged member of AIM accused of stealing some old boots at a
time when the Bureau was professing to be too shorthanded to
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The thing that we was [supposed] to do was use
CB radios, have people... positioned in different
places, on hills and things. And we was going to
have an assault vehicle go to about three houses
that we figured they was at, and shoot them
up... We would do the shooting, shoot the place
up and make our run and go to Rapid City. Stay up
over night, party around and then come back the
next day, you know. Not be in the area when it
happened. But, like I said, we had three or four
different plans that we was going to use. . .[B]ut
our intentions never were to go right down into
that place [the Jumping Bull property]. That was
just one of the places that we was going to hit. We
could have hit them from the road, you know....
One alternative plan was for Brewer's GOONs to
shoot up some of the Jumping Bull houses, precipitating
a return of fire from the few AIM members expected to
be gathered there. A force of FBI agents and a BIA
SWAT team would then use this as a pretext to arrest
everyone on the property, "and we [the GOONs] could
cover for them on the way back. We had three different
plans, I guess. We sat down there at the creek I don't
know how many times and went over that." As it hap-
pened, however, Coler and Williams were sent in to get
things rolling, but "we never really knew they had [ac-
complished this at] the Jumping Bull place with all these
warriors down there. And that's when they killed them
agents." Asked why he and his men hadn't responded to
Williams' radioed pleas to "get on the high ground" ad-
jacent to the Jumping Bull property and provide cover-
ing fire while he and his partner withdrew, Brewer
explained:
If we could have got ourselves into that position
where we went to the top of that hill, they [AIM]
would have had us before we got out of the, got to
the highway, the way. they were set up. That would
havebeen a losing battle there.
It is beyond the scope of this article to recapitulate
all of the circumstances under which Northwest AIM
leader Leonard Peltier was brought to trial in 1977 and
convicted of two counts of first degree murder in the
deaths of Williams and Coler. This happened after an
all-white jury in Cedar Rapids, Iowa had acquitted his
codefendants, Bob Robideau and Darelle "Dino" But-
ler, both of whom openly acknowledged at trial to
-shooting at the agents, by reason of their having plainly
acted in self-defense. 6 4 Tellingly, Judge Gerald Heaney,
.bead of the three-member panel of the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals which last reviewed Peltier's case, ap-
.eared on national television in 1989 to admit he was
"deeply troubled" during his own investigation of the
matter. The reason for the judge's discomfort? "[I]t be-
came increasingly apparent to me that the FBI was at
least as much to blame for what happened as Peltier."
65
More recently, Heaney has joined Hawaii Senator
Daniel Inouye and other members of Congress in sign-
ing a petition to George Bush requesting that Peltier be
pardoned.
6 6
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At one point toward the end of his interview,
Brewer was asked how he justified the sorts of things
that he had been involved in as a GOON. Almost pen-
sively, he acknowledged that, "Well, you really can't.
.There really isn't no justification for it... It's just what
we done at the time, and there's no way you can go back
and 'change what's already done." Exactly. And no
number of evasions, withheld documents, denials, or
other lies on the part of the FBI and its friends will make
the truth of what the Bureau did to AIM and its support-
ers any less true. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
played much the same role on Pine Ridge during the
mid-70s that the CIA has played vis d vis Roberto
D'Aubisson's hit teams in El Salvador throughout the
1980s. The GOONs, for their part, fulfilled exactly the
same requirements on the reservation that other death
squads have played throughout Latin America over the
past-four decades and more. Structurally, the forms and
functions assumed by all parties to such comparisons
investigate the murders (by that, point) of about two-score AIM
members. More, the Bureau's case was so weak against Eagle that
he was eventually acquitted of any wrongdoing in "the cowboy
boot caper."
64. The differences in evidentiary rulings extended by the
judges presiding over the Peltier and Butler/Robideau' cases ac-
count for the different outcomes of the two trials, and are ana-
lyzed quite well in Messerschmidt, op. cit. Suffice it here to note
that the three-judge Eight Circuit Court panel which reviewed
Peltier's first appeal found 23 reversible errors in the conduct of
his trial, most of them associated with FBI misconduct. The court
nonetheless allowed Peltier's conviction to stand. Interestingly, by
the time the panel's opinion was rendered, its head, William Web-
ster, had departed the bench to assume a new career. Webster had
accepted a position as Director of the FBI. For the Circuit Court's
opinion, see ('nired States v. Leonard Peltier, 858 F.2d 314, 335 (8th
Cir. 1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 945 (1979).
65. Judge Heaney made his remarks on the CBS news program
lWest 571h Street in 1989. The reason for his consternation is appar-
ent in the opinion rendered by the three-judge panel of the Eighth
Circuit Court, headed by himself,. which reviewed. Peltier's second
appeal. After first acknowledging that the original circumstantial
ballistics case presented against the defendant was flawed beyond
redemption, and could thus not really support the murder convic-
tions, the panel went on to rebut prosecutorial arguments that
Peltier was actually convicted of simply aiding and abetting in the
alleged murders (recall that the Butler/Robideau jury had con-
cluded for all intents and purposes that no murders had in fact
occurred). The panel still allowed Peltier's conviction to stand -
although they plainly could not say exactly what it is he was con-
victed of- because: "We recognize there is evidence in this rec-
ord of improper conduct on the part of some FBI agents, but we
are reluctant to impute even further improprieties to them." See
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, "Appeal
from the United States District Court for the District of North Da-
kota, United States v. Peltier," No. 95-5192, September 12, 1986. p.
16.
66. A portion of the impetus behind this move may derive from
the fact .that the individual who actually shot Coler and Williams
has now gone on record to this effect, explaining exactly what
happened during the firefight, and why. See Matthiessen, Peter,
"New Light on Peltier's Case: Who Really Killed the F.B.I. Men."
The Nation, May 13, 1991.
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are essentially the same."
7
The FBI's employment of outright death squads to
accomplish the repression of AIM may be the the most
extreme example of its kind in modern U.S. history. It is
nonetheless hardly isolated or unique in principle. To
the contrary, ample evidence exists that the Bureau has
been experimenting with and perfecting this technique
of domestic counterinsurgency for nearly thirty years.
There can be little question at this point that the Ku
Klux Klan, riddled with FBI agents provocateurs such as
Gary Thomas Rowe and overlapped as it was with local
police forces in the Deep South, was used by the FBI
during the early-60s against the civil rights movement in
much the same fashion as the GOONs were later used
against AIM. 6 8 The same analysis can be applied with
regard to the Klan, in alliance with other neo-nazis,
murdering five members of the Communist Workers
Party in Greensboro, North Carolina in November of
1979.69
Certainly, the special unit of State's Attorney's Po-
lice which assassinated Black Panther Party leaders Fred
Hampton and Mark Clark in Chicago on December 4,
1969 was functioning as a death squad under at least
nominal Bureau control. 70 Similarly, Chicago was af-
flicted with a neo-nazi/police/FBI/military intelligence
amalgamation known as the "Legion of Justice" during
the first half of the 1970s. 7 1 No less striking is the com-
bination, evident during the late-60s and described at
length by provocateur Louis Tackwood in The Glass House
Tapes, of state and local police red squads with the Bu-
reau's Los Angeles COINTELPRO Section and area vig-
ilante groups, for purposes of physically destroying the
"California Left." As Tackwood and other Bureau-spon-
sored infiltrators of dissident organizations have stated,
often and categorically, assassination of "key activists"
is a standard part of the tactical methodology utilized by
America's political police.7
2
Bearing this out, the Secret Army Organization
(SAO) developed under aegis of the FBI in southern
California during the early-70s; its express purpose,
among other things, was to liquidate "radical lead-
ers."7 3 On another front, there was the death squad
formed by the Portland, Maine police (with apparent co-
operation from the local FBI resident agency) during
the same period as a means of "coming to grips" with
the area's anti-war and prison rights movements. Then
again, there is the example of the consortium in Puerto
Rico - consisting of a special police unit tightly inter-
locked with the island's FBI field office, the CIA, U.S.
military intelligence units, and right-wing Cuban exile
groups - which was responsible for scores of bombings
and beatings over the years. Attributable to this entity
are, at the very least, the execution-style murders of la-
bor leader Juan Caballero in the island's El Yunque rain
forest in 1977, and of independentista activists Arnaldo
Dario Rosado and Carlos Soto Arrivi near the mountain
village of Cerro Maravilla on July 25, 1978.
74
This pattern of activities should be coupled to the
fact that not one FBI agent has ever served so much as a
minute of jail time because of the conduct involved.
These realities must serve to inform and temper the un-
derstandings of activists and scholars alike, the former
in terms of their appreciation of what they ire up
against as they struggle to achieve positive social change
in the U.S; the latter in terms of the paradigms by which
they attempt to shed light on the nature of power dy-
namics in America. In either case, it is plain enough that
there is no longer any excuse for the generalized self-
delusion among American progressives that such things
are "anomalous" within the context of the contempo-
rary United States. True death squads are not only pos-
sible in the U.S., they have been a relatively common
phenomenon for some time. It is already well past the
point where we should have gotten the government's
message, and begun to conduct ourselves accordingly.
67. There are are a number of excellent readings mining this
vein. Some of the best include Langguth, A.J., Hidden Terrors: The
Truth About U.S. Police Operations in Latin America (Pantheon Publish-
ers, New York, 1978); Lernoux, Penny, Cry of the People: United
States Involvement in the Rise of Fascism, Torture, and Murder and the
Persecution of the Catholic Church in Latin America (Doubleday and
Co., New York, 1980); and Herman, Edward S., The Real Terror
Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda (South End Press, Boston,
1982).
68. For a partial (rather sanitized) record in this regard, see
U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Government Operations
with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report: Supplementary
Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights ofAmericans,
Book III, 94th Congress, 2d Session, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C., 1976.
69. See Bermanzohm, Paul C. and Sally A., The True Story of the
Greensboro .lassacre, Cisar Chauce Publishers, New York, 1980.
70. For the most comprehensive accessible examination of the
Hampton-Clark assassinations, see Agents of Repression, op. cit., pp.
64-77, 397-404. For officially acknowledged (sanitized) context,
see U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Government Opera-
tions with Respect to Intelligence Activities, The FBI's Covert Pro-
gram to Destroy the Black Panther Party, 94th Congress, 2d Session,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1976.
71. See Jayko, Margaret (ed.), The FBI on Trial. The 'ictoiy of the
Socialist Workers Party Suit Against Government Spying, Pathfinder
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AIM CASUALTIES ON PINE RIDGE, 1973-1976
In our books, Agents of Repression (South End Press,
1988) and The COLVTELPRO Papers (South End Press,
1990) Jim Vander Wall and I have used the figure 69 as
the minimum number of AIM members and supporters
murdered on the Pine Ridge Reservation from mid-
1973 through mid-1976. This has provoked claims on
the parts of various FBI apologists that we "exaggerate"
the gravity of the situation. Our first response to such
critics is that it ultimately matters little in terms of the
implications at issue whether the number of AIM casual-
ties was in the upper 40s - as the Bureau itself has ad-
mitted - or the upper 60s, as we contend. Our second
response is the following itemized list of casualties, in-
cluding the names of the victims, the dates and causes of
their deaths (where known), and, so far as is possible,
the status of FBI investigations (if any) into their
murders. Our third response is that, as we've said all
along, even this itemization is undoubtedly incomplete.
We therefore request any individuals having knowledge
of murders other than those listed - or who are aware
of the names of any of the individuals killed while pack-
ing supplies into Wounded Knee - to contact us with
this information.
04/17/73 Frank Clearwater - AIM member killed by
heavy machine gun round at Wounded
Knee. No investigation.
04/23/73 Between eight and twelve individuals (names
unknown) packing supplies into Wounded
Knee were intercepted by GOONs and
vigilantes. None were ever heard from
again. Former Rosebud Tribal President
Robert Burnette and U.S. Justice
Department Solicitor Genderal Kent
Frizzell conducted unsuccessful search for
mass grave after Wounded Knee seige.
No further investigation.
04/27/73 Buddy Lamont - AIM member hit by M-
16 fire at Wounded Knee. Bled to death
while pinned down by fire. No
investigation.
06/19/73 Clarence Cross - AIM supporter shot to
death in ambush by GOONs. Although
assailants were identified by eyewitnesses,
brother Vernal Cross - wounded in
ambush - was briefly charged with
crime. No further investigation.
07/14/73 Priscilla White Plume - AIM supporter
killed at Manderson by GOONs. No
investigation.
07/30/73 Julius Bad Heart Bull - AIM supporter
killed at Oglala by "person or persons
unknown." No investigation.
09/23/73 Philip Black Elk - AIM supporter killed
when his house exploded. No
investigation.
09/22/73 Melvin Spider - AIM member killed at
Porcupine, S.D. No investigation.
10/05/73 Alo ,sius Long Soldier - AIM member killed
at Kyle, S.D. by GOONs. No
investigation.
10/10/73 Phillip Little Crow - AIM supporter
beaten to death by GOONs at Pine
Ridge. No investigation.
10/17/73 Pedro Bissonette - OSCRO organizer and
AIM supporter assassinated by BIA
Police/GOONs. Body removed from Pine
Ridge jurisdiction prior to autopsy by
government contract coroner. No further
investigation.
11/20/73 Allison Fast Horse - AIM supporter shot
to death near Pine Ridge by "unknown
assailants." No investigation.
01/17/74 Edward Means, Jr. - AIM member found
dead in Pine Ridge alley, beaten. No
investigation.
02/18/74 Edward Standing Soldier - AIM member
killed near Pine Ridge by "party or
parties unknown." No investigation.
02/27/74 Lorinda Red Paint - AIM supporter killed
at Oglala by "unknown assailants." No
investigation.
04/19/74 Roxeine Roark - AIM supporter killed at
Porcupine by "unknown assailants."
Investigation opened, still "pending."
09/07/74 Dennis LeCompte - AIM member killed at
Pine Ridge by GOONs. No investigation.
09/11/74 Jackson Washington Cutt - AIM member
killed at Parmalee by "unknown
individuals." Investigation still
"ongoing."
09/16/74 Robert Reddy - AIM member killed at
Kyle by gunshot. No investigation.
11/16/74 Delphine Crow Dog - sister of AIM
spiritual leader Leonard Crow Dog.
Beaten by BIA police and left lying in a
field. Died from "exposure." No
investigation.
11/30/74 Elaine Wagner - AIM supporter killed at
Pine Ridge by "person or persons
unknown." No investigation.
12/25/74 Floyd S. Binias - AIM supporter killed at
Pine Ridge by GOONs. No investigation.
12/28/74 Yvette Lorraine Lone Hill - AIM supporter
killed at Kyle by "unknown party or
parties." No investigation.
01/05/73 Leon L. Swift Bird - AIM member killed
at Pine Ridge by GOONs. Investigation
still "ongoing."
03/01/73 Martin Montileaux - killed in a Scenic,
S.D. bar. AIM leader Richard Marshall
later framed for his murder. Russell
Means also charged and acquitted.
03/20/75 Stacy Cottier - shot to death in an ambush
at Manderson. No investigation.
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03/21/75 Edith Lagle Hawk and her two children -
AIM supporter killed in automobile
accident after being run off the road by a
white vigilante, Albert Coomes. Coomes
was also killed in the accident. GOON
Mark Clifford identified as having also
been in Coomes car, escaped.
Investigation closed without questioning
of Clifford.
03/27/75 Jeanette Bissonette - AIM supporter killed
by sniper in Pine Ridge. Unsuccessful
attempt to link AIM members to murder;
no other investigation.
03/30/75 Richard Eagle - grandson of AIM
supporter Gladys Bissonette killed while
playing with loaded gun kept in the
house as protection from GOON attacks.
04/04/75 Hilda R. Good Buffalo - AIM supporter
stabbed to death at Pine Ridge by
GOONs. No investigation.
04/04/75 Jancita Eagle Deer - AIM member beaten
and run over with automobile. Last seen
in the company of FBI agent provocateur
Douglass Durham. No investigation.
05/20/75 Ben Sitting Up - AIM member killed at
Wanblee by "unknown assailants." No
investigation.
06/01/75 Kenneth Little - AIM supporter killed at
Pine Ridge by GOONs. Investigation still
"pending."
06/15/75 Leah Spotted Elk - AIM supporter killed
at Pine Ridge by GOONs. No
investigation.
06/26/75 Joseph Stuntz Killsright - AIM member
killed by FBI sniper during Oglala
firefight. No investigation.
07/12/75 James Brings Yellow - heart attack caused
by FBI air assault on his home. No
investigation.
07/25/75 Andrew Paul Stewart - nephew of AIM
spiritual leader, Leonard Crow Dog,
killed by GOONs on Pine Ridge. No
investigation.
08/25/75 Randy Hunter - AIM supporter killed at
Kyle by "party or parties unknown."
Investigation still "ongoing."
09/09/75 Howard Blue Bird - AIM supporter killed
at Pine Ridge by GOONs. No
investigation,
09/10/75 fcisJim Little - AIM supporter stomped
to death by GOONs in Oglala. No
investigation.
10/26/75 Olivia Binias - AIM supporter killed in
Porcupine by "person or persons
unknown." Investigation still "open."
10/26/75 Janice Black Bear - AIM supporter killed
at Manderson by GOONs. No
investigation.
10/27/75 Michelle Tobacco - AIM supporter killed
at Pine Ridge by "unknown assailants."
Investigation still "ongoing."
12/06/75 Carl Plenty Arrows, Sr. - AIM supporter
killed at Pine Ridge by "unknown
persons." No investigation.
12/06/75 Frank LaPointe - AIM supporter killed at
Pine Ridge by GOONs. No investigation.
01/??/76 Anna Mae Pictou Aquash - AIM organizer
assassinated on Pine Ridge. FBI involved
in attempt to conceal cause of death.
Ongoing attempt to establish "AIM
involvement" in murder. Key FBI
personnel never deposed. Coroner never
deposed.
01/05/76 Lydia Cut Grass - AIM member killed at
Wounded Knee by GOONs. No
investigation.
01/30/76 Byron DeSersa - OSCRO organizer and
AIM supporter assassinated by GOONs in
Wanblee. Arrests by local authorities
result in two GOONs - Dale Janis and
Charlie Winters - serving two years of
five year state sentences for
"manslaughter." Charges dropped against
two GOON leaders, Manny Wilson and
Chuck Richards, on the basis of "self-
defense" despite DeSersa having been
unarmed when shot to death.
02/06/76 Lena R. Slow Bear - AIM supporter killed
at Oglala by GOONs. No investigation.
03/01/76 Hobart Horse - AIM member beaten, shot
and repeated run over with automobile at
Sharp's Corners. No investigation.
03/26/76 Cleveland Reddest - AIM member killed at
Kyle by "person or persons unknown."
No investigation.
04/28/76 BettyJo DuBray - AIM supporter beaten
to death at Martin, S.D. No investigation.
05/06/76 Marvin Two Two - AIM supporter shot to
death at Pine Ridge. No investigation.
05/09/76 Julia Pretty Hips - AIM supporter killed at
Pine Ridge by "unknown assailants." No
investigation.
05/24/76 Sam Afraid of Bear - AIM supporter shot
to death at Pine Ridge. Investigation
"ongoing."
06/04/76 Kevin Hill - AIM supporter killed at
Oglala by "party or parties unknown."
Investigation still "open."
07/03/76 Betty Means - AIM member killed at Pine
Ridge by GOONs. No investigation.
07/31/76 Sandra Wounded Foot - AIM supporter
killed at Sharp's Corners by "unknown
assailants." No investigation.
Note: The authors would like to express
appreciation to Candy Hamilton, Bruce
Ellison and Ken Tilson for their various
assistance in assembling this detailed
chronology.
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SHATTER (From the Habitat) artist: Jane Zweibel
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